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other mechanism, onto a neighbor's land in a manner or quantity different from its natural flow; and (3) landowners who alter the flow of
surface water must act in good faith and avoid unnecessary damage to
adjacent property. The Association argued the City and College's actions fell under the second and third exceptions.
To establish the second exception, the Association produced a declaration and three-page report from an expert. The expert opined that
paving and grading the property altered the land from its natural forested state in which the water would have percolated into the ground.
However, the court held that paving and grading alone are insufficient
to establish liability in the absence of specific facts showing that the
paving and grading collected, concentrated, and channeled the water
in an unnatural manner. The Association made no such showing here.
As to the third exception, also known as the "due care exception,"
the Association contended that the City and College failed to act in
good faith because they were aware that surface water was draining
into the ravine causing damage, yet they took no action. The court
disagreed, noting the due care exception applies only when the landowner alters the water's natural flow, which the Association failed to
establish. The court further noted that the College pre-dated the
Shorewood Hills subdivision by fifteen years. Thus, when it was developed, the College had no reason to suspect that its actions would burden a neighboring housing development with excess water.
The court also rejected the Association's claims that the City assumed a statutory duty from King County to maintain the ravine when
the City incorporated. The court affirmed the summary judgment motion in favor of the City and College.
Noah Klug
WYOMING
Snider v. Kirchhefer, 115 P.3d 1 (Wyo. 2005) (denying a petition for
abandonment of water rights because of failure to show reasonable
likelihood that injury would result from reactivation of the water
right).
Yvonne Snider had a 1915 water appropriation right on Six Mile
Creek. The appropriation permitted the diversion of water from Six
Mile Creek at a point on Fred and Donita Kirchhefers' ("Kirchhefers")
land. An easement to construct, maintain, and repair the ditch as well
as a right of way across the Kirchhefers' land accompanied Snider's
appropriation. The Kirchhefers had no surface appropriation rights
for Six Mile Creek but possessed a ground water permit from the
Kirchhefer Spring No. 1, a well built into the creek bank of Six Mile
Creek approximately 100 feet upstream from the point of diversion.

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

On August 29, 2001, Snider entered the Kirchhefers' land to repair
Budget No. 2 Ditch after at least five years of no beneficial use. The
Kirchhefers objected to the construction activities, alleging that Snider
was outside her easement at the wrong point of diversion. The
Kirchhefers sought and received a temporary restraining order to stop
construction activities. On August 31, 2001, the Kirchhefers filed a
petition for abandonment of the appropriation, alleging Snider had
not used the appropriation for more than five years. On May 9, 2002,
the Board of Control ("Board") ordered the abandonment of the appropriation. Snider appealed to the district court. The court remanded the case to the Board because the Board's order contained no
findings of fact or conclusions of law to establish a reasonable likelihood that abandonment would benefit or injure the Kirchhefers' water
right. On August 28, 2003, the Board found that the Kirchhefers
proved a reasonable likelihood that benefit from abandonment or injury by resuscitation would result. Snider appealed again to the district
court and the court found that the Board made appropriate findings
and affirmed the decision. Snider appealed.
The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the Wyoming statute governing the abandonment of water rights. In order to have standing to
petition for abandonment, the Kirchhefers needed to prove three essential elements: 1) that they possessed a valid water right of equal or
junior status to the water right sought to be abandoned, 2) that the
water right relied upon by the Kirchhefers and the water right for
which a declaration of abandonment was sought are from the same
source of supply, and 3) that they stand to benefit from a declaration
of abandonment or to sustain an injury by reactivation of the contested
water right.
The court focused on the third element, and found that the
Kirchhefers must prove they have a reasonable likelihood that the
abandonment would benefit their water right or reactivation would
injure it. The court examined the Board's findings and found the
Board's inquiry focused on the Kirchhefers' appropriation only if subject to regulation. The court found that injury to the Kirchhefers
would only result if regulation occurs. The court held that evidence
was absent to support a finding that there was a reasonable likelihood
that regulation would actually occur because there was insufficient evidence to support the allegation that Six Mile Creek was limited in supply or that the creek experienced historical shortages.
Consequently, the court found that the Kirchhefers failed to provide sufficient evidence to show a reasonable likelihood that benefit
from abandonment or injury by resuscitation would result. The court
reversed the district court's order upholding the abandonment and
remanded with directions to deny the petition for abandonment.
Laura L. Chartrand

